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Avowedly apolitical, Hong Kong is in the midst of the most 
rapid political transition in China, and the success of this transition 
is crucial not only for the seven million residents of Hong Kong, 
but also for the future of China itself.  How the authorities in 
Beijing respond to democratic demands from Hong Kong, and how 
the government of Hong Kong treads a democratic pathway within 
the boundaries of the Basic Law, are two of the most important 
questions in international politics today.  China’s decisions about 
Hong Kong will tell us much about the prospects of democratic 
transformation in China itself, and on that crucible the future of 
the twenty-first century might turn. 
Hong Kong was once an island of political stability punctuated 
by occasional bursts of tumult, as in the 1967 riots.1  Today Hong 
 
       †      Queen’s University. 
      ††     Harvard University. 
 1. The view of Hong Kong as a politically indifferent economic city has long 
prevailed.  The best-known advocate of this position is Siu-kai Lau, who has written 
extensively on the subject.  See generally SUI-KAI LAU, FROM TRADITIONAL FAMILISM TO 
UTILITARIANISM FAMILISM (1978).  In a 1995 article, Lau and Hjin-chi Kuan 
described the people of Hong Kong as “the attentive spectators.”  Sui-kai Lau & 
Hjin-chi Kuan, The Attentive Spectators: Political Participation of the Hong Kong Chinese, 
14 J. NE. ASIAN STUD. 3 (1995).  This view is robustly contested by Lam Wai-man.  
See generally LAM WAI-MAN, UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL CULTURE OF HONG KONG: 
THE PARADOX OF ACTIVISM AND DEPOLITICIZATION (2004). 
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Kong is in perpetual political motion punctuated by short timeouts 
to catch its political breath. Becoming a British colony after the 
1840 Opium War, Hong Kong grew slowly as a port and 
commercial entrepot, ruled by a British governor.2  The economic 
transformation of Hong Kong into a world-class city was given a 
mighty push after the Second World War as the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) won the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek.3  
Hong Kong became a refuge from the communists as 
entrepreneurial talent, capital, and large numbers of people flowed 
into the island from south China after 1949.4  To its everlasting 
credit, Britain encouraged a strong civil society and built an 
impressive liberal state.  An impartial, honest, and competent civil 
service, the rule of law, autonomous unions, churches, the press, 
and an economic strategy of minimal interference in the capitalist 
economy are all part of Hong Kong’s impressive inheritance from 
Westminster.  In particular, with the creation of the Independent 
Commission Against Corruption in the 1970s, Hong Kong became 
a leader in creating a professional nonpartisan civil service.5  Hong 
Kong became an island of freedom, civility, and stability in a very 
tough neighborhood.  A substrate consisting of the rights and 
institutions that underlie democracy—freedoms of speech, of 
association, of religion, of assembly; a vibrant free press; a tolerance 
of political criticism and debate about government and other 
issues—was gradually laid down, and over time grew deeply 
ingrained.  Hong Kong thus developed what we might call a strong 
“culture of liberty”—which by itself does not constitute or provide 
democracy, but which is a necessary foundation for any democratic 
institutions worthy of the name.  What Britain did not attempt—at 
least until 1992, when it sent Chris Patten, the first governor from a 
political background (and, some would say, even thereafter)—was 
any serious development of locally based institutions of direct 
 
 2. See JAN MORRIS, HONG KONG 136–37 (1985) (describing Hong Kong as the 
“most important entrepot of the China coast”); see also G.B. ENDACOTT & A. 
HINTON, FRAGRANT HARBOUR: A SHORT HISTORY OF HONG KONG 20 (2d ed. 1968) 
(noting that Hong Kong was officially declared a British colony in June of 1843).  
See generally FRANK WELSH, A BORROWED PLACE: THE HISTORY OF HONG KONG 280–
313 (1993); JACK BEECHING, THE CHINESE OPIUM WARS (1975). 
 3. See STEVE SHIPP, HONG KONG, CHINA: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE BRITISH 
CROWN COLONY’S TRANSFER TO CHINESE RULE 12–16 (1995).  See ENDACOTT & 
HINTON, supra note 2, at 34–35; THE HONG KONG READER: PASSAGE TO CHINESE 
SOVEREIGNTY 56–57 (Ming K. Chan & Gerald A. Postiglione eds., 1996). 
 4. See SHIPP, supra note 3, at 14. 
 5. See WELSH, supra note 2, at 492–93, 531. 
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democracy.  The British Foreign Office and the local economic 
elite were content to portray Hong Kong as an economic oasis, 
uninterested in politics, so that when Mrs. Thatcher’s government 
negotiated the return of Hong Kong to China, one sovereign 
power simply replaced another.  The people of Hong Kong had no 
say in the matter.  The Basic Law was crafted in the mid-1980s, but 
it was not applied until 1997.6  The British continued the executive-
led government that had ruled the colony, and the Chinese were 
happy to accept this model.  Patten himself made a valiant effort to 
create a more democratic culture and a new set of institutions 
(over the opposition of the Foreign Office), but it was too little and 
too late to have much impact on the basic structure of the system in 
place at the time of the handover.7  Britain bequeathed liberty, but 
it did not bequeath democracy. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE IN HONG KONG 
Starting in 1997, then, Hong Kong has had to develop its 
political institutions on the fly.  There has been almost constant 
political change since the handover, and the pace of 
democratization, though gradual, has been steady.  When Britain 
began to negotiate with China over the Basic Law in the 1980s, for 
example, 100 percent of the legislators were appointed by the 
British governor.8  Since the September 2004 election, none of the 
legislators are appointed.9  The main institutional elements can be 
 
 6. See JONATHAN DIMBLEBY, THE LAST GOVERNOR: CHRIS PATTEN AND THE 
HANDOVER OF HONG KONG 51 (1997). 
 7. Christopher Patten describes his experience as the last governor of Hong 
Kong (and his frustration with the lack of British government support in disputes 
with China prior to the 1997 handover) in EAST AND WEST: CHINA, POWER, AND THE 
FUTURE OF ASIA (1998).  Britain only began introducing democratic reforms after 
it had initiated discussions with Beijing over the handover.  Thus, talks began in 
1979, and elections for District Council were not introduced until 1982.  DIMBLEBY, 
supra note 6, at 104–06.  In 1984, the governments of Britain and China reached 
an agreement to return Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty in 1997, but the 
people of Hong Kong had no say in the matter.  Id. at 50–52.  There was no vote, 
only a consultation with those who were affected most.  Id.  In 1985, an indirect 
election component of functional constituencies was added to the Legislative 
Council, only after the 1984 Joint Declaration.  Joseph Chan & Elaine Chan, 
Perceptions of Universal Suffrage and Functional Representation in Hong Kong: A 
Confused Public?, 46 ASIAN SURVEY 257, 259 (2006).  In 1991, for the first time there 
were direct elections for eighteen of the sixty LegCo seats.  Id.  Patten’s travails are 
described in DIMBLEBY, supra note 6. 
 8. Chan & Chan, supra note 7, at 258. 
 9. Id. at 259. 
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succinctly sketched: the Basic Law makes clear that Hong Kong is a 
part of China, albeit with a fifty-year window until 2047 in which the 
city will enjoy special status as a Special Administrative Region (HK 
SAR), keeping both liberty and a capitalist economy.10  The Basic 
Law outlines the rights and duties of the Chief Executive, the 
legislature, and the judiciary.11  There is unlikely to be any mistake 
about the ultimate arbiter of Hong Kong’s fate—in March 2004, for 
example, the Standing Committee of China’s National People’s 
Congress interpreted the Basic Law’s provisions to circumscribe 
Hong Kong’s current debate on democratic reform.12  Reform 
toward universal suffrage in selecting the Chief Executive in 2007 
or the legislature in 2008 would proceed only if a “need” was 
demonstrated and then in a “gradual and orderly manner.”13  Both 
the schedule and substance of democratic reform will require 
support of two-thirds of the Legislative Council (LegCo), consent 
of the Chief Executive and the approval of the Standing 
Committee.14  Beijing made it clear in April 2004 that any reforms 
in 2007 or 2008 will be incremental and within the existing spirit of 
the Basic Law.15 
The Chief Executive is selected by an Election Committee of 
eight hundred,16 which itself is determined by a complicated 
formula involving 180,000 voters.17  Limited to two five-year terms, 
in 1996 shipping magnate Tung Che Hwa won an easy victory (320 
votes) over Ti Lang Yang (forty-two votes) and Peter Woo (thirty-six 
 
 10. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA, Art. 5 [hereinafter BASIC LAW]. 
 11. BASIC LAW, Chap. IV. 
 12. See Decision of the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress on Issues Relating to the Methods for Selecting the Chief Executive of 
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the Year 2007 and for Forming 
the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region in the 
Year 2008, S.S. No. 5 to Gazette Extraordinary No. 8/2004, at E7, available at http: 
//www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/0426npcsc_e.pdf [hereinafter Decision of 
the Standing Committee]. 
 13. Id. at E9, E11. 
 14. BASIC LAW, Art. 159. 
 15. Decision of the Standing Committee, supra note 12, at E5, E7. 
 16. BASIC LAW, Art. 45; Annex I. 
 17. See Press Release, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, U.S. 
Dep’t of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices—2001 (Mar. 4, 2002), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2001/eap/8289.htm. For the 
December 10, 2006 election, the election committee pool of voters increased in to 
over 200,000, of this pool over 50,000 voted to elect a committee of 800.  See Press 
Release, Electoral Affairs Commission, Subsector Elections Concluded with 427 
Members Returned to Election Committee (Dec. 11, 2006), available at http:// 
www.hketony.gov.hk/usa/press/2006/dec06/121106.htm. 
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votes).18  In 2002, Tung was reelected unopposed.19  Further, in 
2002, Tung initiated a major change in the executive system of 
Hong Kong. Prior to 2002, the functions of policymaking and 
administrative communication had been based in the Hong Kong 
public service, with the policy secretaries of the departments and 
bureaus the key executive actors.20  The Executive Council, a hold-
over from its days as the main advisory body to the Colonial 
Governor, was composed of civil servants, LegCo members, and 
representatives of the “great and good” of Hong Kong, i.e., 
academics, business people, and community activists.21  In 2002, 
Tung proposed, and the legislature agreed, to change this system 
by appointing fourteen principal officials as the political heads of 
the departments and bureaus or de facto ministers, serving at the 
pleasure of the Chief Executive.22  Called the “Accountability 
System for Principal Officials,” the accountability of the officials is 
to the Chief Executive, not to the legislature or people of Hong 
Kong.23  Under Tung, the twenty-one-member Executive Council 
had fourteen principal officials or ministers joined by seven other 
nominees drawn from the Legislature and the wider community.24  
In Canada, such members of the Cabinet without departmental 
authority are called “Ministers Without Portfolio.”  Representatives 
of parties in the Legislature sit on the Executive Council, but have 
not yet served as principal officials or political heads of the 
departments or bureaus, and there is debate whether Article 79(4) 
of the Basic Law prohibits this evolution.25  In October 2005, in his 
 
 18. See generally Phillip Bowring, Hong Kong: The Unknown Future Boss Won’t Be 
‘Elected’, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 30, 1996, available at http://iht.com/articles/ 
1996/10/30/edbow.t_1.php. 
 19. See Hong Kong Government Homepage, 2002 Chief Executive Election, 
Election Result http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/ce_election/result_e.htm 
(last visited Jan. 22, 2007) (stating that Tung was the only validly nominated 
candidate). 
 20. See generally WELSH, supra note 2, at 486–88. 
 21. See id. at 486. 
 22. See Letter from Joseph W. P. Wong, Sec’y for the Civil Serv., Gov’t of the 
Hong Kong Special Admin. Region, to Colleagues (Apr. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.csb.gov.hk/print/english/letter/943.html (outlining the proposal’s 
“main points”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See Press Release, Hong Kong Econ. & Trade Office, San Francisco, Chief 
Executive Appoints Officers to Serve in New Accountability System (June 24, 
2002), available at http://www.hketosf.gov.hk/sf/ehk/ehongkong12/chiefexec 
utive.htm. 
 25. See generally BASIC LAW, Art. 79(4). 
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first Policy Address as Chief Executive, Donald Tsang announced 
further changes to the Executive Council and Principal Officials’ 
accountability system: only Tsang and the top three Principal 
Officials (Chief Secretary, Finance, and Justice) will attend all 
meetings of the Executive Council.26  Other officials will attend only 
when there are items on the agenda affecting their portfolios.27  
Tsang also appointed eight new non-official members to the 
Council, making a total of twenty-nine.28 
Tung’s second five-year term as Chief Executive came to an 
early close in March of 2005 when he resigned, citing health 
reasons.29  The official line was challenged by, among others, 
Christine Loh, the feisty head of the Civic Exchange think tank, 
who mused in her newsletter that Tung’s early demise was rooted 
in Beijing’s concern that the incumbent had lost credibility and 
could no longer maintain stability within Hong Kong.30  The Chief 
Secretary Donald Tsang became Acting Chief Executive according 
to the process outlined in Article 53 of the Basic Law.31  The 
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress ruled that 
the new Chief Executive will serve for approximately two years 
(until 2007), being the end of Tung’s prior term, as set forth in the 
electoral timetable contained within the Basic Law.32  In May of 
 
 26. See Press Release, Hong Kong Gov’t, Framework of Accountability System 
for Principal Officials (Apr. 17, 2002), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/ 
general/200204/17/0417251.htm. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See Press Release, Hong Kong Econ. & Trade Office, Hong Kong Chief 
Executive Appoints New Members to Executive Council (Oct. 14, 2005), available 
at http://www.hketousa.gov.hk/usa/press/oct05/ny_101405.htm [hereinafter 
Chief Executive Appoints New Members]. 
 29. Press Release, Constitutional Affairs Bureau, Acting Chief Executive’s 
Opening Statement (Mar. 12, 2005), available at http://www.cab.gov.hk/cd/eng/ 
media/p031205.htm. 
 30. In her newsletter, Tung’s Rumours, Loh suggests that Premier Wen Jiabao 
himself “dressed down” Tung in December 2004, and that the senior leadership in 
January 2005 decided that Tung had to go. Christine Loh, Tung’s Rumours, CIVIC 
EXCHANGE, Mar. 6, 2005, http://www.civic-exchange.org/?p=236. 
 31. Any concerns regarding the relative credibility (and ensuing social 
stability) of the former Chief Executive would appear to be well founded.  A Hong 
Kong University Poll taken in May of 2005 indicated that Donald Tsang enjoys a 
“confidence level” of 77 percent.  AFX News Limited, Hong Kong's Caretaker 
Leader Tsang Enjoys Broad Public Support (May 10, 2005), http://www.forbes. 
com/finance/feeds/afx/2005/05/10/afx2016669.html.  At the time Tung left 
office, he held an approval rating of 18 percent and a “no-confidence” rating of 69 
percent.  Id. 
 32. Standing Committee of the Tenth National People’s Congress, The 
Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of 
6
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2005, Mr. Tsang resigned as Acting Chief Executive to run in the 
election;33 he was nominated in June by nearly seven hundred of 
the eight hundred members of the Election Committee.34  Since his 
two opponents failed to receive the one hundred votes necessary to 
run in the election, Tsang was elected unopposed.  He was 
appointed Chief Executive on June 21, 2005 by the Council of State 
of China.35  The next election for Chief Executive will be March 25, 
2007.36 
LegCo has sixty members, thirty directly elected by a 
proportional representation system based on universal suffrage, 
and thirty elected from functional constituencies of business 
groups, accountants, and so on—a limited franchise (similar to the 
franchise that selects the Election Committee that chooses the 
Chief Executive).37  The Legislature passes laws proposed by the 
Chief Executive and its approval is required to authorize the 
budget.38  LegCo has the right to debate policy and question the 
principal officials, but it has no role in the Executive, and private 
member bills require concurrent majorities among both the 
geographic members elected on universal suffrage, and of the 
functional constituencies.39  In the September 2004 election, 
democratic reform advocates won 62 percent of the vote and 
twenty-five seats in the sixty-seat legislature.40  Turnout was a 
healthy 55.6 percent.41  Democratic advocates are proposing that a 
 
Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, L.S. No. 2 to 
Gazette Ext. No. 5/2004, at B431, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/ 
fulltext/0406npcsc_e.pdf. 
 33. See Hong Kong Government Website, Donald Tsang Resigns (May 25, 
2005), http://www.news.gov.hk/en/category/administration/050525/html/0505 
25en01002.htm. 
 34. See Xinhua, Donald Tsang Appointed Chief Executive of HKSAR (2005), 
http://english.sina.com/taiwan_hk/p/1/2005/0621/35475.html [hereinafter 
Xinhua,Tsang Appointed]. 
 35. See Hong Kong Government Website, Donald Tsang Appointed Chief 
Executive (June 21, 2005), http://www.news.gov.hk/en/category/administration/ 
050621/html/050621en01002.htm. 
 36. See Xinhua, Tsang Appointed, supra note 34 (noting that Donald Tsang’s 
term will expire by June 30, 2007). 
 37. BASIC LAW, Annex II. 
 38. Id. at Art. 73. 
 39. Id. Annex II. 
 40. See Hong Kong Government Website, 2004 Legislative Council Election 
(Sept. 13, 2004), http://www.elections.gov.hk/elections/legco2004/english/ 
results/rs_fc_overall.html [hereinafter 2004 Election Results]. 
 41. See Press Release, Hong Kong Gov’t Info. Ctr., HKSAR Government 
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referendum be held on whether the functional seats’ limited voting 
system should be replaced by universal suffrage,42 but this initiative 
has been opposed both by the Chief Executive and Beijing.  In 
January 2004, former Chief Executive Tung created a Task Force 
on the Constitution, headed by then-Chief Secretary Donald Tsang, 
to suggest institutional reforms.43  Changes there may be, but 
universal suffrage in 2007 for the Chief Executive and 2008 for the 
legislature will not be among them.  In the fall of 2005, Tsang 
proposed a modest expansion of the Election Committee to 1,600 
members from eight hundred and increase of LegCo by ten 
members.44  But Tsang’s package failed to gain the necessary two-
thirds of the members of LegCo with near unanimity of opposition 
from the democratic bloc.45 
The pace of democratic reform remains a source of great 
concern for many reformers.  The institutional strength of the 
LegCo and the structure of its electoral system—which is thought 
to create obstacles for opposition movements—have also been 
flagged as problematic by those in the pro-democratic camp.46  The 
legitimacy of existing elections, however, would not likewise appear 
to be in dispute.  In the wake of complaints regarding the integrity 
of the September 2004 LegCo elections, the Chief Executive 
commissioned an investigative report to look at the management, 
planning, conduct, and monitoring of elections.47  The findings of 
 
Responds to US Congressional-Executive Commission on China’s Hearing on HK 
(Sept. 24, 2004), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200409/24/ 
0924290.htm (noting that 55.6 percent, representing a 1.7 million voter turnout, 
was a historic high). 
 42. Janus Lam, Hong Kong Democracy Fire Stoked Again, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 
17, 2004, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FK17Ad03.html. 
 43. See Press Release, Hong Kong Gov’t Info. Ctr., Chief Secretary’s Speech 
on Constitutional Development Task Force’s Visit to Beijing (Feb. 11, 2004), 
available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200402/11/0211260.htm 
(speaking on a number of principles outlining the future development of Hong 
Kong). 
 44. See Press Release, Hong Kong Gov’t Info. Ctr., CE’s Speech at the Wilton 
Park Conference (Nov. 4, 2005), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/ 
200511/04/P200511040005.htm.  Tsang outlined his proposal as “a significant 
step forward on the road to universal suffrage.”  Id. 
 45. See Associated Press, China Criticizes Hong Kong Lawmakers for Rejecting 
Planned Political Change, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22, 2005, available at  
http://iht.com/articles/2005/12/22/news/hong.php (calling the vote a setback 
for both Beijing and Donald Tsang). 
 46. Joseph Y. S. Cheng, Hong Kong’s Democrats Stumble, 16  J. DEMOCRACY 141 
(2005). 
 47. Hong Kong Government Website, Report of the Independent Committee 
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the “Independent Committee of Experts” would suggest that, 
despite some procedural kinks and potential for improvement, the 
elections were fair and independent.48  International observers 
likewise confirmed that the September elections were seen as 
generally free, open, and contested.49 
A final point of reference is the engagement and expectations 
of the citizens of Hong Kong.  Voters may not have the right to cast 
their ballot for the Chief Executive, but they do have the liberty to 
demonstrate, and this right they have exercised exuberantly.  In 
1989, one million turned out to protest the Tiananmen Square 
outrage.50  On July 1, 2003, a massive demonstration of 500,000 
citizens opposed the government’s proposed legislation on internal 
security.51  The legislation was withdrawn and the principal official 
responsible for the legislation resigned.  On July 1, 2004, another 
huge demonstration of approximately 200,000 people demanded 
advancement of democracy in Hong Kong.52  Prior to the 
December 2005 LegCo vote on Tsang’s Constitutional package, 
another 80,000–200,000 marched peacefully for universal 
suffrage.53  With 3.2 million voters, demonstrations of such 
magnitude comprise 10–15 percent of the voting base, while parties 
in North America and Europe are happy to have 1–2 percent of 
their membership turn out for a major event.  Public criticism by 
LegCo members, supplemented by a hypercritical media, has 
already forced the resignations of three principal officials in the 
short time since the accountability system was introduced.  
Moderation is still the center of political gravity in Hong Kong: 
democrats won most of the votes in September 2004, but the pro-
Beijing Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong 
 
of Experts for the Review on the Management, Planning and Conduct of Elections 
(May 6, 2005), http://www.info.gov.hk/info/report05/index.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 
Background Note: Hong Kong (Sept. 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ 
bgn/2747.htm. 
 50. See SHIPP, supra note 3, at 70. 
 51. Philip P. Pan, Huge Crowd Marches Again for the Vote in Hong Kong, WASH. 
POST FOREIGN SERV., July 2, 2004, at A08. 
 52. Mark L. Clifford et al., Behind the Revolt: The Rise of People Power Has 
Changed Hong Kong and China Forever, BUS. WK. ONLINE, July 21, 2003, http://www. 
businessweek.com/magazine/content/03_29/b3842007_mz046.htm. 
 53. Kent Ewing, Hong Kong Democracy Movement Gets New Life, ASIA TIMES 
ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2005, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL06Ad02.html. 
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(DAB) party won the most seats (twelve).54  Yet far from its 
reputation for political apathy, Hong Kong is in fact in a 
democratic boil.  Expectations are high and the public is aroused.  
All parties support democratization.  Both Beijing and the new 
Chief Executive will have to handle the Constitutional file with 
great finesse.  Tsang’s first effort at reform resulted in a narrow 
legislative defeat—but the issue will not go away. 
The continuing importance of the debate over democracy is 
illustrated by four recent events: first, by the formation, in March of 
2006, of a new Civic Party, committed to democracy;55 and second, 
by the emergence of Anson Chan as a proponent of more rapid 
progress toward universal suffrage—and, possibly, as a contestant in 
the next election for Chief Executive.  Chan, former Chief 
Secretary and a major figure in Hong Kong’s governmental 
landscape (as viewed both from Hong Kong and internationally), 
held a press conference on June 26, 2006 to lend her prestige to 
the democratic wing, saying, “Mr. Tsang should show more effort 
and courage to fight for democracy.”56  She also announced that 
she would be marching in upcoming pro-democracy 
demonstrations, and refused to rule out a future campaign for Mr. 
Tsang’s job.57  A third event that has brought attention to universal 
suffrage is the return of Regina Ip, the former secretary of security, 
to Hong Kong from a sabbatical in the United States.  Ip, who 
championed the draconian Article 23 that brought half a million 
into the streets, surprised many by advocating in her Master’s thesis 
both achieving universal suffrage in 2012 and amending the Basic 
Law to allow “the organic nexus between the executive and 
legislative branches.”58 
 
 54. See 2004 Election Results, supra note 40; Robin Fitzsimons, The Joint 
Declaration: Who Will Stick Up for Hong Kong’s Right to Decide, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
Sept. 16, 2004, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/09/16/edrobin_ed3 
_.php (stating that a record number of voters opted for democracy); Philip 
Bowring, Hong Kong Elections: When Winners Lose, the Message Is the Victory, INT’L 
HERALD TRIB., Sept. 10, 2004, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/09/ 
10/edbowring_ed3_.php  (calling the election an important symbolic role). 
 55. See generally Civic Party Website, News About CP, http://www.civicparty. 
hk/cp/pages/cpnews-e.php (last visited Feb. 19, 2007). 
 56.  Press Release, Anson Chan Speech (June 26, 2006) (on file with 
authors). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Regina Ip Lau Suk Yee, Hong Kong: Case Study in Democratic 
Development in Transitional Society (2006) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Stanford 
University) (on file with authors, summary available at http://savantas.org/ 
docs/HKDemocraticDevelopment-e.pdf). 
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The most dramatic democratic advance occurred in January 
2007, when Alan Leung, a well-known lawyer and member of 
LegCo, was nominated by the Civic party to contest the election for 
Chief Executive in March 2007.  Leung announced that he 
obtained enough nominations (one hundred) from the eight-
hundred member Election Committee to be a formal candidate in 
the March 25, 2007 election.  In December 2006, democratic 
leaders, like Anson Chan, had urged voters who were entitled to 
vote in the election for members of the Election Committee to 
support a democratic slate. More than 50,000—out of the eligible 
voting pool of over 200,000—participated in the election.59  A pro-
democracy coalition backed a slate of 137 candidates, and they 
succeeded in electing sufficient numbers to sign Leung’s 
nomination papers.  The incumbent, Donald Tsang, is the 
overwhelming favorite since more than half of the Election 
Committee of eight-hundred is appointed by Beijing and their 
allies.  But the Tsang-Leung contest means that Hong Kong will 
have its first opportunity to select its Chief Executive in a contested 
election.  Interestingly, the March 2007 election will also be the 
first election in recent years where a territory controlled by the 
Communist Party of China will have the semblance of a real 
contest. 
II. PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
As a background to our examination of the governance and 
accountability system in place in Hong Kong, it is useful first to 
establish some general principles as a point of departure.  All 
societies face the challenge of organizing and legitimating 
collective activities—identifying public interests, setting priorities 
for public action, designing ways in which the prioritized interests 
can be advanced, collecting the necessary resources, and carrying 
out the decided programs.60  The challenge of governing can be 
divided into two broad areas: 1) legitimate political decision 
making that recognizes and sets priorities among competing public 
interests; and 2) competent, efficient, and effective design and 
administration of the legitimately chosen public actions.  A good 
 
 59. See Press Release, Electoral Affairs Commission, supra note 17. 
 60. See generally ADAM PRZEWORSKI ET AL., SUSTAINABLE DEMOCRACY 35 (1995) 
(discussing the need for both citizens and states to define their roles and 
obligations to each other). 
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governance system must thus provide effectiveness both for 
political decision-making and for competent execution.  In 
addition, it needs to provide some sort of evidence (to whom) 
about its performance on the public’s behalf—and what sanctions 
can be applied to it (and by whom) if its performance is found 
wanting. 
Accountability systems answer the question: “Who is 
responsible to whom for what?”  It is about responsibility, the 
responsibility of those using delegated authority to answer for their 
actions.  Government accountability frameworks concentrate on 
two main questions: What is the system by which the government is 
accountable to the citizenry?  What is the system by which the 
public service is accountable to the political leadership?  The new 
accountability system of Hong Kong tries to address the question of 
how the public service can be made accountable to the Chief 
Executive, but it is silent on the prior question of how the 
government as a whole is to be made accountable to the citizens of 
Hong Kong. 
In full democratic electoral accountability systems, citizens 
through their vote legitimize and formally give authority to leaders 
to act on their behalf.  In their turn, those who have been 
delegated the power to make decisions—prime ministers, 
presidents, permanent secretaries, directors-general, etc.—must 
answer for how they have discharged the duties that they have been 
delegated.  As Adam Przeworski emphasizes in Sustainable 
Democracy: 
The conditions under which democratic institutions 
generate incentives for government to be accountable are 
quite stringent; they are not met by all institutional 
frameworks.  Governments are accountable only when 
voters can clearly assign the responsibility for 
performance to competing teams of politicians, when the 
incumbents can be effectively punished for inadequate 
performance in office, and when voters are sufficiently 
well informed to accurately assess this performance.61 
Therefore, there are three A’s in any democratically viable system: 
authority, accountability, and answerability. 
Authority is the formal power to act.  But how does it happen 
that one person has authority over others?  This is one of the 
perennial questions in political philosophy.  As humankind 
 
 61. PRZEWORSKI, supra note 60, at 108. 
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progressed from the family to the tribe, to the city, to the state, 
force was the initial source of authority.  We obeyed because others 
were stronger.  But those who held power because of the sharpness 
of their swords soon discovered that force was not enough.  
Willingness to obey was better if freely given, so divine right was 
brought into play.  Authority was found in God and interpreted by 
his delegates on earth.  Emperors and kings were happy to promote 
their divinity.  Yet, starting in Athens in the fifth century and slowly 
gaining momentum through the ages until it was proclaimed as a 
new principle of authority in Britain’s Glorious Revolution of 1688, 
and America’s Revolution in 1776, was the idea that human beings 
are free agents, bound only by conscience, so that political 
authority exists only because we consent to obey it.  What is critical 
is not force, but the psychological disposition that it is right to 
obey.  According to Pierre Trudeau, in an essay written prior to 
becoming Prime Minister of Canada, “Human Societies, then, 
differ from the beehives in that men are always free to decide what 
form of authority they will adopt, and who will exercise it.  And it 
really is men who have the responsibility of taking these decisions—
not God, Providence, or Nature.”62 
Willing obedience—as contrasted with begrudging 
compliance—then, depends upon the perception that authority 
has legitimacy.  There are many different ways for governments to 
earn legitimacy.  Competence and effectiveness in understanding 
and advancing the public’s interests can confer legitimacy to a 
degree—for example, the Allied administration of post-war 
Germany came to be regarded by most as a legitimate system of 
governance, even though it was initially imposed by force, because 
it manifestly was designed to be (and was in practice) competently 
serving the interests of those it governed.63  But in the twenty-first 
century, for most people, more complete legitimacy will have to be 
earned by facing an electoral test—a process of one person and 
one vote.64  Elites that rely on force or a rigged electoral process 
will eventually face a legitimacy crisis because sooner or later their 
 
 62. PIERRE ELLIOTT TRUDEAU, APPROACHES TO POLITICS 31 (I. M. Owen trans., 
1970). 
 63. See Formula for Germany, TIME, Oct. 2, 1944, available at http://www.time. 
com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,933104,00.html (describing the tripartition— 
into three separate administrative zones—of Germany during post World War II 
occupancy). 
 64. See PRZEWORSKI, supra note 60, at 108. 
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citizens will choose not to obey.65  However, this has not yet 
occurred in either China or Hong Kong. 
In recent decades, a unique mix of China’s socialist ideology 
together with a general desire for social stability and economic 
development has contributed to the people’s “choice” to obey their 
political leadership.  But the ideology of the Chinese Communist 
Party has been substantially reoriented in light of expansive market 
reforms, and the capacity of the PRC to ensure social stability will 
continue to be called the test of the regime.66 
Yet democratic electoral legitimacy is obviously the biggest 
challenge for the Hong Kong accountability framework, because 
neither the governance structure of the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region nor that of the People’s Republic of China 
relies on direct election with universal suffrage.  The Chief 
Executive is selected by a committee of eight hundred, not the 3.2 
million voters of Hong Kong, and the Basic Law is interpreted by a 
political body of the National People’s Congress (not a court), 
which itself is the product of a one-party system that does not face a 
broad electoral test.  The Basic Law itself acknowledges the 
authority-legitimacy dilemma in Hong Kong, since Article 68 
proclaims that “[t]he ultimate aim is the election of all the 
members of the Legislative Council by universal suffrage.”67  The 
Basic Law states the aim but not the timetable and is hedged with 
restrictions. 
The impact of this structure is profound: the intent of the 
Basic Law is to have an executive-led system.68  The passage of a 
government bill requires a simple majority of the legislative body 
while bills on amendments introduced by LegCo members require 
majorities both from the democratically elected members and the 
functional constituencies.69  LegCo cannot introduce measures 
pertaining to public expenditure (although its approval is required 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. Data and opinion based on the legitimacy of the CCP can be found, for 
example, in Mary E. Gallagher, Reform and Openness: Why China’s Economic Reforms 
Have Delayed Democracy, 54 WORLD POLITICS 338 (2002). See also JIE CHEN, POPULAR 
POLITICAL SUPPORT IN URBAN CHINA 179–84 (2004).  In his book, Chen concludes 
that, although the PRC enjoys a high level of legitimacy in Beijing, diffuse and 
specific support for the regime is on the decline, and, if current trends persist, 
could pose a threat to CCP rule in the long run.  Id. at 183–84. 
 67. BASIC LAW, Art. 68. 
 68. Id. Art. 43, 60 (stating that the Chief Executive shall be the head of the 
HK SAR). 
 69. Id. Annex II, § 2. 
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for the Executive Committee’s budget),70 and the Chief Executive 
has the power to decide whether government officials must give 
evidence to LegCo.71  But the exercise of those strong theoretical 
powers has made plain the real weakness of the HK SAR’s 
executive-led government, because in any conflict with the 
legislature, it is the LegCo members who have democratic 
legitimacy, not the Chief Executive.  After the July 1, 2003 massive 
demonstration, the Chief Executive had to withdraw his legislation 
on internal security because the Liberal party head, James Tien, 
resigned from the Executive Committee in protest and with the loss 
of the Liberal party’s eight votes, the legislation would have been 
voted down.72  LegCo routinely attacks the principal officials, who 
often resign because the government does not have enough 
democratic legitimacy to withstand negative bursts of public 
opinion.  Despite having party representatives from the Legislature 
as members of the Executive Council, the government cannot 
count on a guaranteed base of party support.  Stephen Lam, the 
Secretary for Constitutional Affairs joked in a July 30, 2004 speech 
to the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation that “[t]he Hong Kong 
government is the most effective minority government on earth.  
We do not have even one Member in the Legislative Council, but 
we manage to get most of our work done.”73  Echoing Lam, Mrs. 
Rita Fan, the President of the Legislative Council, said in an 
October 26, 2004 speech to the same audience that “[t]he 
Government had the power but no votes, while the Legislature had 
the votes but no power.”74  For enduring stability in Hong Kong, 
this legitimacy-authority gap must be closed. 
 
 70. Id. Art. 74 (requiring Legislative Council members to obtain the written 
consent of the Chief Executive before introducing bills relating to government 
policies). 
 71. Id. Art. 48(11). 
 72. See Philip Bowring, Hong Kong: The Power of the People, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
July 9, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/07/09/edbowring_ 
ed3__0.php (stating that Tien’s resignation forced the government to defer 
legislation). 
 73. Stephen Lam, Sec’y for Constitutional Affairs, Constitutional Affairs 
Bureau of the HKSAR Gov’t,  Constitutional Development: Dialogue and 
Consensus, Address to the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (July 30, 2004), 
available at http://www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsarticle 
=152. 
 74. The Honourable Mrs. Rita Fan, President of the Legislative Council, The 
Relationship Between the Executive Authorities and the Legislature, Address to 
the Hong Kong Democratic Foundation (Oct. 26, 2004), available at http:// 
www.hkdf.org/newsarticles.asp?show=newsarticles&newsarticle=155. 
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Accountability is the requirement to account for the authority 
delegated by the legitimate source of authority.  Public servants for 
example, should treat their clients or the public fairly and 
efficiently, but the civil service is not accountable to the public.  
They are accountable to the permanent secretary, who is 
accountable to the Principal Official, who is accountable to the 
Chief Executive.  Who is responsible to whom, and for what, is the 
central question in any accountability framework. 
Here, too, the HK SAR has much work to do.  Principal 
Officials are political appointments responsible to the Chief 
Executive, but they are not political party appointments as in most 
other systems.  They are individuals, some from the public service, 
some from business, civil society and the social sector, brought 
together temporarily to do a critical job.  But what is the glue that 
holds the team together?  There is none, because in every other 
system, the organizing force comes from the party (or parties).  
Hong Kong is so anti-party that the legislature passed a bill 
requiring the Chief Executive to forgo any party affiliation.  Yet it is 
party membership and experience that gives ministers the political 
skills they need to communicate, organize, plan political strategy, 
advocate, and lead.  If the principal officials do not really operate 
like a political party then this task falls to the permanent public 
service.  But politics runs against the ethic of partisan neutrality 
that every public service holds dear.  In China, the party is 
dominant and that country is striving to build an autonomous civil 
service.  In Hong Kong, the public service has historically been 
unusually dominant in public affairs, responsible de facto for 
managing both sides of the governance coin—the politically neutral 
administration that is the traditional task of a professional civil 
service and the political balancing of competing public interests 
that, in electoral political systems, is the domain of elected officials 
and their political appointees. 
We believe that the professional civil service of Hong Kong 
cannot permanently continue to be simultaneously responsible—as 
it has de facto been at least for the last fifty years—both for 
politically neutral administration and for managing the political 
discourse and balancing in a society that faces increasingly complex 
political matters.  Neutral administrative capability is a great asset 
for Hong Kong; its reputation for competent and honest 
administration makes it an attractive location for business, 
investment, and commerce.  Maintaining competent and politically 
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neutral administration—and answering for administrative 
competence (rather than for political policymaking)—requires a 
degree of insulation from political matters.  But dealing 
competently and effectively with the political questions of 
balancing interests and setting priorities among competing 
demands for public attention—development, immigration, health, 
education, transportation, equity, justice, liberty, and security—is 
also crucial for the continuing success of Hong Kong.  Hong Kong 
must, therefore, in our view, begin systematically to separate the 
administrative challenges from the political challenges and begin 
building a cadre of politically minded and experienced people with 
the inclination and the skills to help navigate the waters of political 
decision making in a free and open society.  The most obvious 
(though perhaps not the only) way to do this would be by 
beginning to develop some form of party system. 
In his policy address of 2005, Donald Tsang announced 
changes to the Principal Official system of his predecessor, but the 
overall direction is unclear.75  First, the position of Chief Secretary 
(Tsang’s old position under Tung) has been revitalized.76  Rather 
than the Principal officials reporting to the Chief Executive on a 
daily basis, all secretaries and heads of Bureaus will report to the 
Chief Secretary or the Financial Secretary.  France has a President 
who develops macro-policies, but a Prime Minister who runs the 
Executive and deals with the Legislature day-to-day.77  Hong Kong 
now has a Chief Executive who is clearly the “Communicator-in-
Chief,” with the Chief Secretary as the focal point for government-
wide coordination.  Further, when the Principal Officer 
Accountability System was announced in 2002, and the fourteen 
Principal Officers were all appointed to the Executive Council, 
many observers were quick to make the analogy that the Executive 
Council was now comparable to the British, or Canadian, 
Cabinets.78  But Tsang also announced that only he and his three 
 
 75. Donald Tsang, Chief Executive of HK SAR, Public Urged to Participate in 
Politics, Address to Legislative Council (Oct. 13, 2005), available at http://www3. 
news.gov.hk/ISD/ebulletin/en/category/ontherecord/051013/html/051013en1
1002.htm [hereinafter Tsang, Address to LegCo]. 
 76. Id. 
 77. See 1958 CONST. tit. II (defining the constitutional attributions of the 
president).  See also id. art. 8 (stating that “[t]he President shall appoint the Prime 
Minister”). 
 78. See Thomas Crampton & David Ignatius, Political Appointees to Replace 14 
Senior Civil Servants: Hong Kong Realigns Government, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 21, 
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senior colleagues would attend all meetings of the Executive 
Council, with the other Principal Officials only attending to discuss 
specific items.  Eight new members were appointed to the 
Executive Council, so this body is now composed with a vast 
majority of part-time appointees.  Easy assumptions about the 
Executive Council evolving into a Cabinet no longer hold.  Today, 
most Principal Officials no longer seem to be Cabinet “Ministers” 
in the British or Canadian sense of the term (though they may be 
like the American cabinet which rarely meets as a collective).  Yet 
the government is becoming more political. Tsang also announced 
that his government would introduce a small number of positions 
dedicated to political affairs and communication.  The Hong Kong 
public service would now have to accommodate political officers, 
just as the Canadian public service learned to do in the 1960s.79  
Tsang said the main duty of the new officers “will be to support the 
Chief Executive and the Principal Officials in their political work.  
This will provide a new channel for people with political aspirations 
to join the Government to realize their ambitions.”80  It is obvious 
that the Accountability System in Hong Kong is still in flux. 
Answerability requires that an account be tendered to those to 
whom an account is due.  In most political systems, it is the 
politicians who do the heavy lifting on political communication.  
Ministers answer questions in parliament, presidents hold regular 
press conferences, etc.  In Hong Kong, much of the 
communication function is carried out by the public service in 
terms of responding to media inquiries; civil servants are known to 
the public in a way that is astonishing to outside observers (in 
contrast, Franklin Roosevelt said his advisors and officials must 
have a passion for anonymity!),81 and principal officials are often 
faulted for communication lapses.  Hong Kong’s Health Minister, 
Yeoh Eng-kiong, resigned after the SARS crisis of 2003 largely 
 
2002, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2002/06/21/kong_ed3_.php 
(stating that the changes represent “a major step away from the British civil service 
traditions built during Hong Kong’s 156 years as a colony”). 
 79. See generally Gordon Robertson, The Changing Role of the Privy Council Office, 
14 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 487 (1971). 
 80. Tsang, Address to LegCo, supra note 75, at Constitutional Development. 
 81. Roosevelt said he wanted men “with a passion for anonymity” on the 
occasion of the release of the Report of the President’s Committee on 
Administrative Management, January 12, 1937.  See BARTLETT’S FAMILIAR 
QUOTATIONS, 971 (14th ed. 1968). 
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because of legislative criticism about his communication efforts.82  
The vibrant media of Hong Kong is hypercritical of the 
government (as is the legislature), and communication skills—most 
importantly, the ability to answer well—have been sorely lacking.  
But is it fair to blame the public service or principal officials?  In 
other systems it is the politicians who communicate, and they do it 
well because they have years of practice and it is their main job—
and those who rise in the political system tend to be those who are 
differentially good at it. 
III. INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
Hong Kong has only been dealing with issues of democratic 
accountability for a few years.  Other countries have been dealing 
with them for centuries.  Great Britain, the United States, and 
Canada have all responded to the accountability question in 
different ways, and these precedents may be useful to Hong Kong. 
England’s first Parliament was in 1265, but it was not until the 
fourteenth century that Parliament began to assume its 
characteristic form, due to the insatiable demands of the English 
Monarchs for money to finance wars.83  The early parliaments had 
many similarities to LegCo: the King-Chief-Executive chose his 
ministers from a personal court, they reported only to him, and 
Parliament’s main role was to pass budgets.84  In the eighteenth 
century, the House of Commons even resembled LegCo by having 
both directly elected and “functional” constituencies.  A great many 
“rotten” boroughs represented very narrow constituencies: the 
clothing trade dominated certain seats; ridings on the British coast 
preferred naval officers; and so on.85  The largest category of 
constituencies, 160 seats, was patronage boroughs in which the 
Monarch had governing influence on who was elected.86  Hong 
 
 82. Hong Kong Government, Dr. Yeoh Eng-kiong Resigns (July 7, 2004), 
http://www3.news.gov.hk/ISD/ebulletin/en/category/issues/040707/html/0407
07en05008.htm. 
 83. See generally RONALD BUTT, A HISTORY OF PARLIAMENT: THE MIDDLE AGES 
(1989) (providing a description of early English parliaments).  The classic work on 
the 18th century parliamentary system is L. B. NAMIER, THE STRUCTURE OF POLITICS 
AT THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III (1929).  See also THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (Vernon Bogdanor ed., 2003) (providing a contemporary 
perspective on Britain). 
 84. See generally BUTT, supra note 83. 
 85. See 1 NAMIER, supra note 83, at 79–82 (discussing the distribution of seats). 
 86. See id. at 164–82 (providing an extensive analysis of representation and 
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Kong’s governing structure in 2005 in many ways resembles 
Britain’s in 1750.  Starting in 1768, reformers began to agitate for 
reform in the House of Commons, and the process took sixty-five 
years until the famous 1832 Reform Act largely eliminated 
functional constituencies.87  In the eighteenth century, too, the 
Monarch gradually began the practice of forming a Ministry, not 
based on personal favourites, but based on leading figures in the 
House of Commons who could manage or control the House.88  
Parties came to Britain in the eighteenth century with the Tories 
and Whigs, and the leader of parties like the Whig Sir Robert 
Walpole began to be recognized as the “Prime Minister.”89  In 
forming a Cabinet, eighteenth and nineteenth century Britain 
began the process of choosing powerful legislators to fill executive 
posts.90  This is an option still open to Hong Kong, depending on 
the interpretation of Article 79 of the Basic Law. 
The American experience with the Electoral College may have 
lessons for Hong Kong’s Election Committee.91  The American 
 
patronage during this era). 
 87. See ANN LYON, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM 326 
(2003) (discussing how reforms brought some improvement, but resulted in an 
imbalance of representation). 
 88. See id. at 302 (discussing the “crisis of 1782–83” whereby the choice of 
ministers were determined, to a degree, by parliamentary support). 
 89. See id. at 281 (stating that Walpole has retrospectively been recognized as 
the first British prime minister and also discussing his ability to effectively 
administer the House of Commons to his will). 
 90. See Anthony Seldon, The Cabinet System, in THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 83, at 129–33 (discussing the changes to the 
Cabinet system during the 1900s). 
 91. In 1789, the Electoral College of the United States was composed of 
electors from states equal to the State’s number of Senators and members of the 
House of Representatives.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.  There were 69 electors in 1789 
and George Washington was elected unanimously.  DAVID MCCULLOUGH, JOHN 
ADAMS 394 (2001).  Hong Kong’s election committee in 1996 had more than four 
hundred members and C. H. Tung’s election was contested.  See Hong Kong 
Legislative Counsel, History of the Legislature, http://www.legco.gov.hk/general/ 
english/intro/hist_lc.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007).  In 1792, Washington was 
again the unanimous choice for president.  MCCULLOUGH, at 439.  The number of 
electors per state was decided by a formula, but the method of their choosing was 
left to the states.  U.S. CONST., art. II, § 1.  Some states chose electors by popular 
vote.  WILLIAM C. KIMBERLING, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 5 (1992), available at 
http://www.fec.gov/pdf/eleccoll.pdf.  In other states, the legislators chose.  Id.  By 
1836, all states except South Carolina chose electors by direct statewide vote.  Id.  
The Electoral College operated without controversy in 1789, 1792, and 1796.  By 
1800, however, the states began selecting electors depending on party lists and the 
1800 election was one of the most bitter in American history.  See MCCULLOUGH, at 
536–57.  In 1800, a sitting President John Adams of the Federalist Party was 
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Founding Fathers began with the same suspicions about parties as 
many have today in Hong Kong.  The Electoral College in 1789 was 
just that—a small committee of leading citizens—who chose the 
best man for Presidency, George Washington.92  But by 1800, the 
small number of electors who voted for the President were 
themselves selected from party lists—that is, parties had begun to 
organize around the presidential contest.93  By the 1820s, the 
number of voters eligible to vote for the Electoral College who 
would in turn vote for the President had been increased to 
approximate universal suffrage (except for African-Americans and 
women!)94  The evolution of the American-style system may be 
suggestive for Hong Kong—the Basic Law provision of an election 
committee could be retained, but the method of choosing that 
committee can be widened considerably, even to include universal 
suffrage.  It took the United States about twelve years to begin to 
change the nature of the Electoral College and about a generation 
to achieve universal suffrage.  If Hong Kong moved as quickly, 2012 
would be a target date for significant reform: the electoral base for 
both the election committee and the functional seats in LegCo, for 
example, could be doubled by that date as an interim step towards 
the goal of universal suffrage.  The potential for useful incremental 
reforms to the Election Committee has already been demonstrated 
by the December 2006 elections for members of the Election 
Committee. Over 200,000 Hong Kong citizens are entitled to vote 
for members of this committee, and the democratic camp was 
successful in electing enough members to sign the nomination 
papers in order for a democrat to run in the March 25, 2007, 
election for Chief Executive. 
The Canadian experience also has relevance for Hong Kong, 
because Canada, too, was a colony.95  In 1791 Britain introduced a 
 
defeated by Thomas Jefferson, a Republican, in an election that finally had to be 
decided by the House of Representatives.  Id. at 556. 
 92. See MCCULLOUGH, supra note 91, at 393–94, 439. 
 93. Kimberling, supra note 91, at 5–6. 
 94. See Jacob Katz Cogan, Note, The Look Within: Property, Capacity, and Suffrage 
in Nineteenth-Century America, 107 YALE L.J. 473, 477–78 (1997) (discussing the 
evolution of suffrage in the United States). 
 95. See generally JANET AJZENSTAT, ONCE AND FUTURE CANADIAN DEMOCRACY: AN 
ESSAY IN POLITICAL THOUGHT (2003) (describing Canada’s constitutional history); 
Robertson, supra note 79 (describing Pierre Trudeau’s introduction of the 
modern Prime Minister’s office); Marc LaLonde, The Changing Role of the Prime 
Minister’s Office, 14 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 509 (1971).  For a description of how the 
Prime Minister’s Office operated, see Thomas S. Axworthy, Of Secretaries to Princes, 
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system familiar to anyone from Hong Kong: a Legislative Council, a 
British-appointed governor, and an Executive Committee filled 
with the friends of the Governor.  As early as 1810, Canadian 
reformers were agitating to have the Executive Council composed 
of legislators who commanded a majority of the House (Pierre 
Bedard, who championed this theory, was thrown into jail for his 
efforts).96  For many years, both in Lower and Upper Canada 
(today’s Quebec and Ontario), there was an alliance between the 
local business-oriented elite and the British-appointed governor to 
keep the reformers at bay.  In 1837, the patience of the Canadian 
reformers had finally grown so thin that there were armed revolts 
(which Britain and the local militia easily quelled).  Canada had to 
wait until the colonial Master was ready.  But with the passage of 
the Reform Bill of 1832, reformers eventually came to power in 
Britain, and in 1848, the North American colonies were finally 
granted responsible government.97  It had taken about fifty years for 
British acceptance of responsible government to catch up with 
Canadian eagerness to have it: The Basic Law, of course, also has 
fifty years to run. 
Much more recently Canada also innovated around the 
question of civil service through developing ministerial 
accountability.  Canada developed a strong party system but it 
inherited a Westminister civil service model of nonpartisan 
neutrality.  By the mid 1960s, the two systems were in growing 
conflict.  The civil service was in danger of being overly political 
with senior ministers like Lester Pearson (who eventually became 
prime minister) coming from the public service, and the Canadian 
version of administrative officers veering into partisan roles.  In 
1968, Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau rationalized the system: a 
partisan Prime Minister’s Office was created to work in tandem 
with the civil service cabinet secretariat.98  This 100-person-strong 
 
31 CAN. PUB. ADMIN. 247 (1988).  For a general description of the Trudeau 
government, see TOWARDS A JUST SOCIETY (Thomas S. Axworthy & Pierre Trudeau 
eds., 1990). 
 96. See Historica Foundation, Parti Canadien, in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
(James H. Marsh ed.,  1988) (describing the incidence of Bedard’s arrest), 
available at http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE& 
Params=A1ARTA0006120. 
 97. See Historica Foundation, The Friendship That Brought Responsible 
Government, in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 96, available at http://www. 
thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm?PgNm=ArchivedFeatures&Params=A27
3. 
 98. See J. E. Hodgetts, Prime Minister’s Office, in THE CANADIAN ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
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office quickly became the political centre of the Liberal 
government.  Each minister also had a personal political stable of 
“exempt staff.”  A political bureaucracy funded by taxpayers, but 
without the job security of the public service, became responsible 
for functions like political strategy, coalition building, media 
communication, and so on.99  Trudeau’s government also funded 
for every party not only a portion of election expenses, but also the 
creation of caucus research offices, or political “think tanks” that 
served as an alternative home for opposition political staff.100  
Politically minded individuals could now gain experience (and 
have careers) outside the civil service.  The Trudeau government 
also funded independent nonpartisan think tanks on economics, 
science, and foreign policy to give the civil service competition in 
the realm of ideas and policy science.101  In short, the Trudeau 
system demanded a partnership between policy and politics: the 
cabinet secretariat was policy proficient but politically sensitive, 
while the Prime Minister’s Office was politically proficient but 
policy aware.  With Hong Kong’s office of Chief Executive now 
having a Director who is a political appointment, a permanent 
Secretary, and an Information Coordinator, plus the innovation of 
a small number of political appointees, Hong Kong is moving in 
the direction of the mixed political-civil-service executive system of 
Canada. 
IV.  CHINA EVOLVES 
China must agree to any fundamental changes in the political 
structure of Hong Kong.  But China, too, is debating how best to 
achieve accountability and respond to demands for change.  These 
two processes inevitably interact.  Since Hong Kong began its 
 
supra  note 96, available at http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com/index.cfm? 
PgNm=TCE&Params=A1ARTA0006475. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See Charles Caccia, Democratic Deficit? What Democratic Deficit?, POLICY 
OPTIONS, May 2004, at 50 (stating the operation of research services are available 
for each political party, allowing “backbenchers” access to researchers to assist 
them on party issues), available at http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/may04/cac 
cia.pdf. 
 101. See, e.g., Ian Brodie, The Court Challenges Program, FRASER FORUM, Oct. 
2002, at 15 (discussing the 1978 launch by the Trudeau Government of the non-
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transition from a colony in the 1980s to an emerging democracy in 
the 1990s and into the twenty-first century, it has experienced three 
transformations in Chinese leadership.  For the aging generation of 
Deng Xiaoping that had participated in the Long March, Hong 
Kong was the symbol of one of China’s greatest nineteenth-century 
defeats, the Opium Wars of the 1800s.102  Margaret Thatcher may 
have initially hoped that Deng might allow some form of British 
administration under Chinese sovereignty to continue after 1997, 
but that was a pipe dream.  As Deng and Ms. Thatcher negotiated 
in Beijing in 1982, an exasperated Deng told the Iron Lady, 
according to her recollections, “[l]ook, I could walk in and take the 
whole lot this afternoon.”103  Jiang Zemin became General Secretary 
of the Chinese Communist Party in June of 1989 and throughout 
his tenure, Jiang had to cope with the aftermath of the party’s 
brutal crushing of dissent in Tiananmen Square.104  Jiang continued 
and even accelerated the economic policies of Deng, but after 
Tiananmen, the party leadership felt threatened by enemies from 
within and out.  Stability was (and it could be argued, remains) the 
mantra, and the war of words with Chris Patten in 1995–97 
reflected the trauma that the senior Chinese leadership felt at the 
time, at even a hint of democratic change.  Hong Kong’s 
misfortune was to be a liberal oasis naturally seeking to make a 
logical transition to “one-person, one-vote” at a time when the 
Chinese authorities were most sensitive about political reform.  On 
the other hand, if political space does eventually open up in China, 
Hong Kong provides a convenient test tube of reform. 
In 2000, President Jiang brought forth a new ideological 
construct—the Three Represents.105  The ultimate doctrine called 
for the CCP to “always represent the developmental requirement of 
China’s advanced productive forces, represent the developing 
orientation of China’s advanced culture, and represent the 
fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese 
 
 102. See generally SSU-YU TENG, CHANG HSI AND THE MAKING OF THE TREATY OF 
NANKING 1842, 13 (1944) (describing the Treaty of Nanking, the concluding treaty 
of the Opium Wars, as being “brought about through British military 
compulsion”). 
 103. See DIMBLEBY, supra note 6, at 46. 
 104. See generally China’s Jiang: Ruling in the Wake of Tiananmen, June 2, 1999, 
CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9906/02/tiananmen/jiang.pr 
ofile/index.html. 
 105. Gang Lin, Ideology and Political Institutions for a New Era, in CHINA AFTER 
JIANG 39, 39 (Gang Lin & Xiaobo Hu eds., 2003). 
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people.”106  This new ideological slant was a sign of changing times 
in a global economy—the Party had expanded its base of support 
to include intellectuals and entrepreneurs who would be key to 
China’s continued growth which, in turn, would be key for social 
stability within the country.  It appeared as though political reform 
was in the air as Jiang’s term came to a close. 
In the winter of 2002, the Chinese Communist party appointed 
a new General Secretary, Hu Jintao, the fourth leadership cadre 
since the 1949 revolution, joining Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, 
and Jiang Zemin.107  President Hu and his Premier, Wen Jiabao lead 
a technocratic elite, educated in the 1960s and, in the early days of 
Hu’s administration, there were grounds for cautious optimism 
that this leadership might be open to some political change, unlike 
the Long March gerontocracy, or those who reacted with such 
overwhelming force against the Tiananmen protesters.  The actions 
and reactions of China’s new rulers have, to date, been mixed.  On 
one hand, the new leadership has made serious attempts to make 
the state-sector public service autonomous from the party and Hu 
has demanded greater accountability within the Party.  On the 
other, the first years of the Fourth Generation have seen a 
crackdown on the media, a withdrawal of various civil liberties, and 
an end to the test ‘project’ in Shenzhen that would have curtailed 
Party control over that region’s day-to-day governance. 
In March 2006, when the National People’s Congress met, how 
to respond to rural unrest was the unspoken priority of the Party.  
According to Tim Johnson, China had 87,000 protests in 2005, 
more than two hundred per day.108  Most occurred in the 
countryside, where average incomes are less than one-third of 
urban dwellers.109  Repression against such demonstrations has 
often been severe.  In Guangdong Province, for example, in 
December 2005, villagers in Dongzhou said that as many as thirty 
people died when police fired upon peasants protesting against the 
seizure of land for a power plant.110  Land is often at the centre of 
disputes.  Families hold bits of land on a long-term lease, but 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. See Lowell Dittmer, Chinese Leadership Succession to the Fourth Generation, in 
CHINA AFTER JIANG 11, 23–24 (Gang Lin & Xiaobo Hu eds., 2003). 
 108. Tim Johnson, Chinese Premier Defends Nation’s Internet Policy, KNIGHT RIDDER 
NEWSPAPER (March 14, 2006). 
 109. Id. 
 110. See generally Philip P. Pan, China Wavers on Police Shooting, WASH. POST, Dec. 
14, 2005, at A21. 
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officials often sell portions to developers without consulting those 
who are farming.  China’s village democracy is much touted, but 
with the recent unrest, some provincial governments are no longer 
allowing non-Party members to participate in village elections.  
Premier Wen Jiabao and the new leadership were certainly seized 
by the issue of the rural divide; in the opening of the 2006 session 
of the National People’s Congress, Wen said, “Building a new 
‘socialist countryside’ is a major historic task.”111  In China’s new 
five-year plan, Wen announced that more money would be 
allocated for education and health care for the rural poor. 
Dealing with official corruption will be a key component to any 
reform undertaken by the Fourth Generation, as it seeks to ensure 
future stability and continued support for the CCP.  Public opinion 
polls consistently reveal corruption to be the number one concern 
of respondents,112 and the overall economic losses resulting from 
corruption have been estimated to be as high as 14.5 percent of 
GDP from 1999 to the end of 2001.113  Public discontent due to 
corruption has even resulted in limited civic action; peasants in 
some rural areas have stormed government buildings to demand 
lower taxes and accuse officials of corruption. 
Premier Wen Jiabao also pledged his support for greater 
official accountability and has vowed to help build a reasonable 
accountability system.  But any change is likely to accord with past 
practice: criticism or censure will be permissible on somewhat of an 
ad hoc basis, at the level of the individual and not that of the Party.  
As such, the larger Party and its leadership remain unaccountable 
(to all but a few of their equally unaccountable peers), the national 
legislature lacks autonomous authority and the rule of law remains 
a distant dream, and some public officials may be held to account 
for their actions.  Communist ideology posits that the CCP 
embodies the will of the people, and constructs such as checks and 
balances or the different roles of party, legislature, and government 
are alien to the Communist theory that the party alone represents 
the people.  So the Beijing leadership is serious about party reform, 
 
 111. China Vows More Money for Poor, CNN.COM, March 5, 2006, http://www. 
cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/03/05/china.parliament/index.html. 
 112. See Sunshine Policy to Fight Corruption in China’s Capital, PEOPLE’S DAILY 
ONLINE (China), Mar. 13, 2002, http://english.people.com.cn/200203/13/ 
eng20020313_92021.shtml (noting corruption was the top concern of the general 
public according to surveys by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences). 
 113. Hu Angang, Public Exposure of Economic Losses Resulting from Corruption, 4 
CHINA & WORLD ECON. 44, 49 (2002). 
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if not democratic reform. 
Following much criticism regarding the spread of SARS in 
2003, for example, both the minister of health and the mayor of 
Beijing were sacked.114  The President of the National Petroleum 
Company (NPC) was likewise held to account in 2003, for a gas well 
blast that killed 243.115  The NPC Standing Committee has, in that 
regard, begun review of a draft law for Civil Servants which would 
require individuals in leading positions to quit the leadership and 
take the blame, if their faults or mistakes lead to major loss or 
social ills. 
Institutional reform has also evolved over the past decade, on 
an extremely limited and sporadic basis, in an attempt to secure 
social stability and curb public discontent.  For example, a 
referendum in 2003 asked residents in Jiangsu to name the worst 
performing officials in certain administrative spheres.116  The 
results led to nine local cadres being reprimanded and forced to 
forgo pay and undertake training.117  Some counties in Guangdong 
province have even begun to open their budgets and hiring 
practices to limited public scrutiny.118  In its Report for 2004, 
Freedom House further reported that the Chinese people are 
increasingly able to bring suits against local governments, 
occasionally winning damage awards.119  Legal-aid programs to 
assist citizens in this regard were first introduced in 1999, and have 
since grown to close to two hundred government and private 
agencies.120  Such instances and institutions of accountability in 
 
 114. Bates Gill, Contagious Confusion: China Will Pay Dearly for the SARS Debacle, 
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 22, 2003, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2003/ 
04/22/edgill_ed3_.php. 
 115. See Chris Yeung, Accountability System Is Not an Attempt to Increase My Power 
or to Bring in Yes-men, Chief Executive Tells Legco, S. CHINA MORNING POST, April 18, 
2002, at 1. 
 116. See Richard Baum, Professor of Political Science & Director of Center for 
Chinese Studies, UCLA Int’l Inst., Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and 
Security Review Commission (April 14, 2005), available at http://www. 
international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=23145 (providing testimony to the 
Congressional Commission on China’s state control mechanisms and methods). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See Freedom House, Country Report, China (2004), http://www.freedom 
house.org/template.cfm?page=22&year=2004&country=2910. 
 120. See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of 
America, China Strives to Provide More Legal Aid to Ordinary Chinese (Sept. 30, 
2004), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gyzg/t163026.htm (providing official 
statistics on the scope of China’s legal-aid system). 
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irrespective of motivation, the overarching goal of social stability 
and order has resulted in some preliminary movement toward a 
more accountable system of governance in China. 
Elections at the village level, for example, have been allowed in 
recent years.121  Candidates are chosen from within the Party and 
choice is often constrained—in some instances severely, due to 
high levels of coercion and rigged voting.  However limited, these 
elections do provide citizens with some sense of choice and 
exposure to a form of democratic process. 
Faced with widespread rural unrest, events in Hong Kong may 
not be at the top of Politburo’s agenda, but Chinese leadership is 
aware that Hong Kong could have a “neighborhood” impact on 
volatile Guangdong.  In September of 2004, President Hu 
opinioned publicly that democracy is a “blind alley” and, in the 
winter and spring of 2004, Beijing fired what Christine Loh has 
called the “Patriot Missives,” attacking the democratic movement in 
Hong Kong, and short-circuiting the electoral reform process for 
LegCo and the Chief Executive.122  But the senior Chinese 
leadership also agreed to the resignation of C. H. Tung when his 
weak performance led to hundreds of thousands of Hong Kong 
citizens demonstrating.123  Still, Beijing is certainly unimpressed 
with the democratic reformers in LegCo.  After the failure of 
Tsang’s Constitutional package, mainland legal scholars held a 
seminar on Hong Kong’s Basic Law in April 2006, which was given 
widespread publicity.  Such high-profile events are often a 
surrogate for the views of the Beijing leadership.  One professor 
said that “Hong Kong’s Democratic Party was misleading Hong 
Kong people through ‘blind worship of universal suffrage.’”124  The 
 
 121. See Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of 
America, 470 Million Chinese Villagers Vote in Village Elections Last Year (May 
18, 2006), http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t253295.htm (citing an annual 
report by the Ministry of Civil Affairs hailing the village elections as a “‘bright 
point’ of the country’s efforts to build a democratic polity”). 
 122. See Patrick L. Smith, Hong Kong Stalls on Road to Democracy, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., Apr. 25, 2006, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/04/24/news/ 
hong.php (quoting Christine Loh, who said that most democrats “now look to 
2012, when legislative elections are scheduled, for the next opportunity to push 
through substantial changes”). 
 123. Compare Press Release, Constitutional Affairs Bureau, supra note 29 
(stating health concerns as the reason for Tung’s resignation), with Christine Loh, 
Tung’s Rumours, supra note 30 (challenging the official line of resignation). 
 124. Beijing Launches Another Attack Against Hong Kong Democracy, ASIA NEWS, 
Apr. 28, 2006, http://www.asianews.it/view_p.php?l=en&art=6032. 
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professor highlighted six shortcomings that must be addressed 
before China could allow universal suffrage, including more 
patriotic education for citizens and passing national security 
legislation.125  Since the last effort to pass a package of national 
security laws brought a half-million people to the streets to march 
against the Tung administration—and, many think, signaled the 
beginning of the end of his hold on his office—this would seem to 
establish a fairly high hurdle to surmount before further progress 
on democratization could take place. 
While Hong Kong shares the Mainland’s valuation of social 
stability, its citizens do not appear to share the Chinese patience for 
reform.  Surveys in Hong Kong consistently show majority support 
for direct elections, and in the 2004 LegCo elections democratic 
reformers received 61 percent of the vote.126  Such findings are 
affirmed by a spate of civic activism and mass political protest in 
recent years.  A lack of truly accountable governance and an 
incomplete system of governing institutions have resulted in: 
political instability on the streets; rising criticism; increasing levels 
of ineffectiveness within the government; and unpredictability 
everywhere.  The desire for democratic reform in the Special 
Administrative Region is peaking as the pace of reform is slowing 
down and China seeks a more active role in overseeing the Hong 
Kong Government’s management of political developments.  It is 
an unsustainable combination that, if allowed to evolve on the 
current trajectory, will likely compromise stability. 
China, then, is the brooding presence overseeing Hong Kong’s 
political development.  Calls by Hong Kong reformers for 
referendums on democracy may worry the Chinese leadership, but 
they also demonstrate that there is a real desire for change.127  The 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. See 2004 Election Results, supra note 40. 
 127. Civic Exchange, an independent think tank headed by former LegCo 
member Christine Loh, has commissioned a report regarding electoral structures 
and public opinion contexts concerning the 2004 Hong Kong Elections.  See Hong 
Kong Transition Project, Half Way to Where?: The Electoral Structures and Public 
Opinion Contexts: 2004 Hong Kong Legislative Council Election (2004), available at 
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp/halfway/halfway.pdf.  Surveys from January 2004 
show that 73 percent of the sample were dissatisfied with the performance of the 
Hong Kong government and 53 percent were dissatisfied with the relations 
between Hong Kong and the People’s Republic.  Id.  See generally  Christine Loh & 
Richard Cullen, Politics Without Democracy: A Study of the New Principal Officials 
Accountability System in Hong Kong, 4 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 127 (2003) (describing 
succinctly the background to Tung’s introduction of this fundamental change).  
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leadership of the Special Administrative Region may be able to use 
the local pressures to push Beijing farther and faster than the 
Communist Party might otherwise like to go.  The key to moving 
forward in Hong Kong is to have a practical program that is fast 
enough to show democrats that reform is on its way, but is 
incremental enough so that Beijing’s worries about stability are not 
stoked to a feverous pitch.  Stability will only be found in this 
increasingly unsustainable political environment if a reasonable 
schedule for reform is clearly set out. 
V. CONCLUSION 
International comparisons have a variety of lessons for Hong 
Kong, but the main one should be optimism.  Many other societies 
faced similar issues, and Hong Kong’s progress so far has been 
quicker than most.  A logical starting point is to aim toward a fully 
considered democratic accountability system, pick a date that 
seems reasonable (say, 2012), and work incrementally from now to 
then to build a system that is coherent and interconnected.  
Eventually, as in Canada during the colonial era, there will be a 
change of attitude in the sovereign government, and when that 
occurs there should be a well thought-out plan ready to go.  
Meanwhile, steps can be taken to advance the agenda without 
unduly threatening those in Beijing who are concerned about the 
implications of democratic reforms in Hong Kong.  Donald Tsang 
has already begun such a campaign, but his first months show that 
on democratic reform, he is between a rock and a hard place. 
Tsang begins his term as Chief Executive with many 
advantages denied his predecessor.  He is experienced in 
government, and has natural communications flair.  The economy 
of Hong Kong is on the upswing.  According to a recent survey, 
three-quarters of Hong Kong citizens are now “satisfied,” compared 
with only 16 percent in 2003, the nadir of Tung’s regime.128  Nearly 
70 percent of those polled want Tsang to run again in the next 
 
Loh’s Civic Exchange think tank, along with the Hong Kong Policy Research 
Institute and Synergy Net co-organized a conference on constitutional 
development in Hong Kong on November 6, 2004, which addressed many of the 
issues raised in our paper.  The results are summarized at http://www.hkpri. 
org.hk/passagesPDF/Others/ConferenceReportNov04_English.pdf. 
 128. Hong Kong Transition Project, National Democratic Institute, Parties, 
Policies and Political Reform in Hong Kong (2006), at 3, available at http://ndi.org/ 
ndi/library/2007_hk_transition_050106.txt. 
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Chief Executive election in 2007.129 
But even with a dynamic new Chief Executive and a return of 
economic growth, the fault lines of Hong Kong’s political system 
prevent progress.  Recently, the Hong Kong Transition Project 
reviewed the first months of the new government and concluded 
“Tsang cannot deliver strong governance without the parties; but 
neither can the parties deliver solutions to people’s problems 
without the government . . . the system remains fundamentally 
flawed.”130 
Tsang must persuade Beijing to move farther, faster.  Beijing 
has ruled out universal suffrage for the 2007 and 2008 elections, so 
the goal must be to concentrate on the election of 2012.  But Tsang 
must also engage with Hong Kong’s political parties, and here the 
task may be just as difficult as dealing with Beijing. 
Parties do many things in a democratic system: they decide 
which problems become “public” and which remain private; they 
articulate concerns and values; they develop policy proposals and 
platforms to deal with the concerns they have championed; they 
persuade blocs of voters that their agenda is the right one, and 
organize those blocs to support their candidates in elections.  But 
in Hong Kong, the parties do few of these things.  The March 2006 
Hong Kong Transition Project Survey shows that the public does 
not readily identify the parties as standing for distinct policy 
positions, except in the broadest possible strokes of the Democratic 
Party championing human rights, and the DAB being in favour of 
closer relations with Beijing.  Beyond this, everything else is 
unclear.  Without distinct social and economic platforms, the 
parties gain their identity largely by being opposed to the Executive 
on an ad hoc basis.  Yet the Executive needs the parties to pass 
measures in LegCo.  Hong Kong’s political fault lines are 
structural, not personal. 
To achieve a better relationship between the Executive 
Committee and the Legislative Committee, some Principal Officials 
should be drawn from the legislature and the existing parties.  For 
example, party leaders from the Liberal Party have sat on the 
Executive Council, but they have never administered a department.  
As it stands, the government has no party to defend it or to 
organize the business of LegCo—why not appoint LegCo members 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
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of the Executive Council as principal officials and give them 
executive authority?  Parties will act responsibly only if they are 
given real responsibilities.  Hong Kong is a system of government 
with a weak base of support in the legislature.  Britain’s precedent 
of having Ministers come from the legislature should be tried.  
Some argue that Article 79(4) of the Basic Law, stating that a 
member of LegCo must resign “when he or she accepts a 
government appointment and becomes a public servant,” precludes 
a LegCo member becoming a principal official.  But this depends 
on how one defines “public servant.”  Principal officials in Hong 
Kong are Ministers; and in other systems, Ministers are not 
considered civil or public servants.  They are politicians.  An 
interpretation of the Basic Law allowed the creation of the 
Principal Official Accountability system without amending the Basic 
Law, and a similar broad interpretation of the Basic Law could 
conceivably allow Principal Officials to be drawn from LegCo.  
Certainly there is now a precedent of inviting LegCo members to 
join the Executive Council. 
Even if Article 79 cannot be interpreted to allow LegCo 
members to become ministers, there is another route to achieve 
party engagement with government.  The Chief Executive could 
strike a bargain with willing parties that they will have the right to 
nominate principal officials in exchange for party support for the 
administration in LegCo.  Under such a system, parties would 
begin to develop distinctive platforms in health or the environment 
which would form the core of their appeal to voters, and if they 
were successful, this would give such a platform democratic 
legitimacy.  To implement their ideas, the parties would nominate 
a minister (subject of course to the approval of the Chief 
Executive).  The Chief Executive in turn would bargain and build a 
coalition of support through such parties, both in LegCo and with 
the public at large.  The Executive Council, which is a part-time 
body, still has great power under the Basic Law to be consulted on 
all important policy issues.  The Executive Council now includes 
some leaders of LegCo parties in a non-executive capacity, and 
these leaders would be joined by their nominees as principal 
officials who would also be members of the council.  Under such a 
system, parties would gain a share of government, and the Chief 
Executive would gain a guaranteed base of support in LegCo.  Such 
a mechanism would not be a law, but it could become a 
convention, and in democratic societies like Britain or Canada, 
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much of their constitutions are convention, not statute. 
Hong Kong must develop a competitive party system.  Parties 
are the essential ingredient that makes the British, American, and 
Canadian systems operate.  It is the party glue that connects the 
pieces.  Hong Kong already assists parties with election expenses: 
like Canada, there could also be grants to create party think tanks 
or research bureaus that do political thinking. Independent 
nonpartisan think tanks could also be seeded with government 
money to provide policy competition to the civil service and 
educate the wider public.  The restriction on party membership for 
the Chief Executive should be dropped.  Hong Kong should invest 
in party development just as it does in skills development.  The 
Democratic Party, for example, only has 631 members (July 2006 
figures) out of a voting population of 3.2 million.131  Parties need to 
become Hong Kong’s vehicle for change and political engagement.  
Weak parties are the weakest link in Hong Kong’s emerging system 
of democracy. 
District Councils, first established in 1982, are the most 
democratically elected institutions in Hong Kong.  Out of a total of 
529 members, four hundred are elected by universal suffrage, with 
102 members appointed by the Chief Executive.  The function of 
District Councils, however, is purely advisory and is limited to local 
issues such as libraries.  But another lesson from history is that town 
hall meetings, local school boards, and municipal governments 
generally are the seed stock of democratic governance.  Through 
such neighborhood institutions, citizens are connected to 
government, and by participating in local government elections, 
prospective politicians learn the subtle arts of democracy.  Many 
members of the Congress in the United States, or members of 
Parliament in Canada have started their careers by running for the 
local school board or as an alderman.  Donald Tsang recognized 
the importance of District Councils by proposing in his 2005 
package of reforms that, of the ten new seats proposed for an 
expanded LegCo, the five functional seats would come from the 
District Councils, in addition to the one functional seat now 
assigned to that sector.132  In essence, Tsang proposed a ten-seat 
 
 131. See Hong Kong Democratic Party Website, http://www.dphk.org/e_site/ 
index_e.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). 
 132. See Sylvia Hui, Hong Kong Proposes Political Reforms, ASSOC. PRESS, October 
19, 2005, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/n/a/2005/10/ 
19/international/i184320D72.DTL. 
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addition to the democratic base of LegCo (five new geographic 
seats elected by universal suffrage and five new functional seats 
from District Councils).  Further, the reform package proposed the 
expansion of the election committee from eight hundred to 1,600, 
with all 529 members of District Councils added to the committee 
making them the largest single group.133  The democratic 
credibility of District Councils would be even more enhanced if the 
Chief Executive gave up the power of appointment (why appoint 
members if the function is only advisory?).  Most importantly, if the 
work of the District Councils could also expand to areas more 
significant to citizens, such as local planning decisions, the 
significance of this entry level position into politics would greatly 
expand.  District Councils could become the first rung of the 
ladder to an emerging political class. 
Hong Kong has already demonstrated “people power,” with 
hundreds of thousands marching in the streets.  The resignation of 
Chief Executive C. H. Tung in 2005 further demonstrated the 
power of public opinion. Donald Tsang’s first actions show that he 
realizes that the existing government structure must evolve to adapt 
to today’s new reality of an engaged citizenry.  Hong Kong is no 
longer only a model of laissez-faire economic development.  It is 
now a test case for peaceful political transition.  On the issue of 
Hong Kong’s democracy, the whole world is watching. 
 
 
 133. Id. 
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